Stíhací letouny, letecká válka

Pro přidání nového příspěvku se přihlašte

Nalezené příspěvky

ja_62 9.10.2009 14:38 - č. 9524
	ja_62 napsal v č. 9521: "Který chytrák plánoval vyrobit do poloviny roku 1943 2000 Me 262? " Vypadá to totiž, že ani výrobce výrobu 2000 kusů Me 262 v prvním pololetí roku 1943 také neplánoval, respektive nepovažoval vůbec za prioritu soustředit zdroje na výrobu Me 262, což bych, vzhledem k tomu, že ještě koncem května 1943 neexistovaly ani výrobní linky pro Me 262, při alespoň pokusu o výrobu 2000 kusů do poloviny roku považoval za přinejmenším vhodné. Alespoň podle díla Adama Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, zabývajícího se ekonomickými dějinami nacistického Německa (kap.19 - No Room for Doubt, s. 621) totiž Willy Messerschmitt nijak výrobu Me 262 netoužil urychlit, jistě ne v prvním pololetí roku 1943؟ The first designs for the Me 262 were brought to Hitler's attention in the summer of 1942 and he immediately gave it his enthusiastic backing. By the end of May 1943, after further testing, the Air Ministry committed itself definitively to pushing the aircraft into mass-production and began to exert severe pressure on Messerschmitt to devote all its resources to the project. If there was any obstacle to accelerated production at this point, it came from Messerschmitt. After the war Willy Messerschmitt and Ernst Heinkel liked to suggest to their audience that Me 262 was 'ready' in 1943, or even in 1942. But this is grossly misleading. In any aircraft development programme, the step from prototype to series production is preceded by literally thousands hours of testing. This is often followed by by experimental series production. Only after completing this indispensable learning process is it safe to invest heavily in mass-production facilities. In 1943 Messerschmitt was still recovering from the disaster it had experienced with the over-hasty series production of Me 210. Instead of forcing the Me 262 into mass-production, Messerschmitt therefore offered the Air Ministry an entire portfolio of designs, including a conventional piston-engined replacement for the Me 109 fighter. Indeed, Messerschmitt intrigued with Speer throughout 1943 to obstruct Milch's efforts to concentrate all available resources on the mass-production of the jet. The main technical problem, in any case, concerned not the airframe but the engines, the truly revolutionary element of the design. Even if the prototypes were being succesfully tested, the world's first operational jet engine was still far from ready for mass-production. Given the enormous technological obstacles that had to be overcome, not only in mass-producing an entirely new kind of propulsion system, but doing so whilst economizing on high-performance alloy metals, this is hardly surprising. Despite the extraordinary pace of development work the Junkers-Jumo jet engine was not ready even for limited series production before the summer of 1944. [Některé pasáže zvýrazněny mnou.]

ja_62 9.10.2009 14:38 - č. 9524

ja_62 napsal v č. 9521:
"Který chytrák plánoval vyrobit do poloviny roku 1943 2000 Me 262? "

Vypadá to totiž, že ani výrobce výrobu 2000 kusů Me 262 v prvním pololetí roku 1943 také neplánoval, respektive nepovažoval vůbec za prioritu soustředit zdroje na výrobu Me 262, což bych, vzhledem k tomu, že ještě koncem května 1943 neexistovaly ani výrobní linky pro Me 262, při alespoň pokusu o výrobu 2000 kusů do poloviny roku považoval za přinejmenším vhodné. Alespoň podle díla Adama Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, zabývajícího se ekonomickými dějinami nacistického Německa (kap.19 - No Room for Doubt, s. 621) totiž Willy Messerschmitt nijak výrobu Me 262 netoužil urychlit, jistě ne v prvním pololetí roku 1943؟

The first designs for the Me 262 were brought to Hitler's attention in the summer of 1942 and he immediately gave it his enthusiastic backing. By the end of May 1943, after further testing, the Air Ministry committed itself definitively to pushing the aircraft into mass-production and began to exert severe pressure on Messerschmitt to devote all its resources to the project. If there was any obstacle to accelerated production at this point, it came from Messerschmitt. After the war Willy Messerschmitt and Ernst Heinkel liked to suggest to their audience that Me 262 was 'ready' in 1943, or even in 1942. But this is grossly misleading. In any aircraft development programme, the step from prototype to series production is preceded by literally thousands hours of testing. This is often followed by by experimental series production. Only after completing this indispensable learning process is it safe to invest heavily in mass-production facilities. In 1943 Messerschmitt was still recovering from the disaster it had experienced with the over-hasty series production of Me 210. Instead of forcing the Me 262 into mass-production, Messerschmitt therefore offered the Air Ministry an entire portfolio of designs, including a conventional piston-engined replacement for the Me 109 fighter. Indeed, Messerschmitt intrigued with Speer throughout 1943 to obstruct Milch's efforts to concentrate all available resources on the mass-production of the jet.
The main technical problem, in any case, concerned not the airframe but the engines, the truly revolutionary element of the design. Even if the prototypes were being succesfully tested, the world's first operational jet engine was still far from ready for mass-production. Given the enormous technological obstacles that had to be overcome, not only in mass-producing an entirely new kind of propulsion system, but doing so whilst economizing on high-performance alloy metals, this is hardly surprising. Despite the extraordinary pace of development work the Junkers-Jumo jet engine was not ready even for limited series production before the summer of 1944.

[Některé pasáže zvýrazněny mnou.]

Diskuzní forum

Registrace | Zapomenuté heslo